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Abstract
What are the implications on trading activity if investors are not sophisticated
enough to understand and evaluate trades that have a complex payoff structure? Can
frictions generated by this type of financial complexity be so severe that they lead
to a complete market freeze, like that of the recent financial crisis? Starting from
an allocation that is not Pareto optimal, we find that whether complexity impedes
trade depends on how investors perceive risk and uncertainty. For smooth convex
preferences, such as subjective expected utility, complexity cannot halt trade, even in
the extreme case where each investor is so unsophisticated that he can only trade up
to one Arrow-Debreu security, without being able to combine two or more in order
to construct a complex trade. However, for non-smooth preferences, which allow for
kinked indifference curves, such as maxmin expected utility, complexity can completely
shut down trade.
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1 Introduction
An implicit assumption when modeling financial markets is that each investor is so-
phisticated enough to be able to understand and trade any available security, however
complex it might be. In reality, however, cognitive limitations do exist. Investors
may have limited attention and time, be unaware of certain dimensions of the payoff
structure, have difficulty formulating complex plans or lack special training. Moreover,
information acquisition about past performance of some securities may be too costly.
The Economic Affairs Committee (2009) reports that “It is hard for investors to eval-
uate complex financial instruments, because difficult risk modeling is required, and
because they are often unaware of the details of the asset pool which backs financial
securitisations”.
To provide an example, consider the following description of security Jayanne 4,
which was marketed by Credit Agricole in 2007 (Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2017)):
This is a growth product linked to a basket composed of the FTSE Euro First
80, the FTSE 100, the SMI and the NIKKEI 225. The Annual Performance
is set at 5% for the first three years. In the following years, if the performance
since the start date of the worst-performing index is positive or null, then
the Annual Performance for that year is registered at 5%, otherwise 0%.
The Basket Performance since the start date is registered every six months.
The Final Basket Performance is calculated as the average of all these six-
monthly readings, capped at a maximum basket performance of 100%. After
8 years, the product offers a guaranteed capital return of 100%, plus the
greater of either the sum of the Annual Performances, or 100% of the Final
Basket performance.
A typical investor probably understands the indices FTSE Euro First 80, FTSE
100, SMI and NIKKEI 225, which are the basic ingredients of the security’s payoff
structure. In other words, he understands a “simple” bet that pays 1 if FTSE 100
is above 6000 tomorrow and 0 otherwise. However, he may fail to understand the
“complex” Jayanne 4, even though it is “just” a combination of these four indices.
Moreover, evaluating bets on these four indices separately is computationally much
simpler than evaluating bets on all possible combinations of the four indices.
Another example of a complex security is the Collaterized Debt Obligation (CDO),
which pools together cash-flow generating assets (mortgages, bonds and loans) and
repackages them into discrete tranches. Because each tranche has a different risk
profile and usually incorporates hundreds of thousands of underlying assets, it is a
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complicated task to work out its payoff structure, even though it is easy to understand
the payoff structure of each separate underlying asset.
A result of these cognitive limitations is that although investors may be able to
trade “simple” securities, they may fail to consider all of their possible combinations
when formulating their portfolio. Polkovnichenko (2005) reports data from the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances, showing that many households invest significant fractions
of their wealth simultaneously in well-diversified mutual funds and in un-diversified
portfolios of individual stocks. Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) derive optimal
under-diversification in a framework with costly information acquisition. Carlin et al.
(2013) show experimentally that complexity makes subjects less inclined to trade.
Is it possible that the effect of these limitations is so large that opportunities for
trade cease to exist completely? We study this question in a complete markets envi-
ronment with general convex preferences, where all Arrow-Debreu (A-D) securities are
available (paying 1 if some state occurs and 0 otherwise).
The complexity of a trade is measured by the number of different values it has across
the state space. A trade that provides a different payoff at every state is generated by
a combination of all A-D securities, hence its complexity is |S|, the number of states.
A trade whose payoff differs only with respect to whether a state has occurred or not
is generated by the respective A-D security, hence its complexity is 2. Cognitively
constrained investors cannot formulate trades that are complex, even if their welfare
would increase as a result.
Our notion of complexity effectively allows investors to formulate only “coarse”
trades, which are measurable with respect to a coarse partition of the state space.
Investors who have maximum perceived complexity of the asset structure can only
construct coarse trades that are measurable with respect to a two-element partition,
consisting of a state and its complement.
Holding preferences and the initial allocation fixed, if there are gains from trade
in an environment without any cognitive restrictions (i.e. the allocation is not Pareto
efficient), will there always be trade when all investors have maximum perceived com-
plexity of the asset structure? We analyze this question by characterizing the existence
of trading opportunities in terms of the investors’ subjective beliefs, in Theorem 2. To
obtain the characterization we restrict attention to preferences and initial allocations
that satisfy a no-arbitrage principle, so that it is not possible for some investors to
make a sure profit. In Proposition 1, we show that no-arbitrage is characterized in
terms of the investors’ subjective beliefs.1
1The notion of subjective beliefs applies to all convex preferences, not just subjective expected utility,
and is defined in Rigotti et al. (2008).
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Whether there is trade in an environment with cognitively constrained investors
depends on their attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. In particular, we find that if
they have smooth preferences at the initial allocation, which do not allow for kinked
indifference curves (e.g. subjective expected utility, smooth ambiguity, multiplier and
mean-variance preferences), trading will not stop even if investors have maximum per-
ceived complexity of the asset structure. This is a robust result, because it implies
that trade will not stop also if the perceived complexity is less severe, so that investors
are able to trade more than one simple security at once. However, we also find that
if all investors have maximum perceived complexity of the asset structure, trade can
completely freeze if preferences are non-smooth, so that the indifference curve of at
least one investor has a kink at his initial allocation. We provide such an example in
Section 2 with maxmin expected utility (MEU) and a full insurance allocation.
This dichotomy of preference models provides behavioral implications. Suppose
that there is trading in an environment where we control the perceived complexity of
the asset structure. If we observe that trading stops as perceived complexity increases,
it must be that some of the investors’ preferences are non-smooth.
The model can also provide an explanation of why trading froze in some markets
during the recent financial crisis. Suppose that financial crises generate a lot of un-
certainty (Caballero and Simsek (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)) and that
investors have non-smooth preferences. If we know that during the crisis the investors’
priors about fundamentals do not change significantly but we nevertheless observe a
market freeze, this can be interpreted as the investors perceiving the asset structure of
this market to be complex.
To provide an example, Acharya et al. (2009) describe how a series of events that
was triggered by an unexpected decrease of the US house prices in the first quarter of
2006 led to the freezing of the market for asset-backed commercial paper in 2007, right
after BNP Paribas announced that it was suspending redemptions from its structured
investment vehicles, which were trading these types of securities. We can interpret
the once in a lifetime decline of US house prices as an event that created uncertainty
about fundamentals. However, non-smooth preferences were not sufficient for shutting
down trade. This happened one year later, exactly when the suspension of redemptions
informed everyone that asset-backed commercial paper was no longer easy to price and
value. That this second event, which did not convey any information about funda-
mentals, triggered an immediate suspension of trade, could be explained by investors
realizing that these securities have a complex payoff structure and therefore cannot
simultaneously trade any subset of them.
We conclude by discussing some aspects of our definition of complexity. First, the
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investors’ maximum perceived complexity of the asset structure is very different (but
less restrictive) from a standard incomplete markets structure with one available A-D
security. The former allows investors to buy or sell any A-D security but not combine
two or more, whereas the latter allows them to trade only the unique security that is
available. Second, employing a complete market structure is not restrictive. In Section
4, we discuss how we can generalize to an incomplete market structure, where there
exists a partition of the state space and a security pays 1 if an event of that partition
occurs and 0 otherwise.
Gul et al. (2017) study investors with cognitive limitations that have coarse (final)
consumption plans, instead of coarse trades. For example, maximum perceived com-
plexity in their model means that the investor chooses among all final consumption
plans that are measurable with respect to a two-element partition of the state space.
However, to finance these consumption plans he is allowed to trade any combination
of the A-D securities, thus generating a complex payoff structure, according to our
terminology. In contrast, in our model an investor having maximum perceived com-
plexity of the asset structure can only execute a trade that is measurable with respect
to a two-element partition, so that if his initial endowment is different across all states,
then in general so is his final consumption plan. Finally, the focus of Gul et al. (2017)
is different from ours, as they show that allocations are riskier and prices are more
extreme when compared to the no perceived complexity case, whereas we examine
whether trade would occur.2
Finally, our approach is not without limitations. We say that a trade is complex
if it reallocates wealth across many states. This is certainly plausible if all the A-D
securities are available (or more generally securities that take only two values, like
betting on whether an index will go up or down), because to construct such a complex
trade an investor needs to combine several securities. It is also plausible if we model
investors who think about their trading strategy by conditioning on a few events, for
example betting on Trump winning the elections, and then delegate to an expert the
construction and execution of the trade. However, it is not plausible if all investors
have to execute their own trades and the available securities pay differently across all
states. Then, constructing a trade that pays 1 if a state occurs and 0 otherwise might
require combining several of these securities. Such a trade would be complex, rather
than simple.
2See Section 5.3 in Gul et al. (2017) for a detailed comparison of the two approaches.
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1.1 Relation to literature
Our paper is related to Billot et al. (2000, 2002), who characterize trading, from a full
insurance allocation, in terms of disjoint sets of priors in a complete markets setting
with a full insurance allocation, using the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
and the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler (1989). Rigotti et al.
(2008) generalize these results for all convex preferences, encompassing many models
with ambiguity averse preferences. Additionally, they characterize trading from any
initial allocation. Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2018) analyze the case of non-convex
preferences.
In the MEU model with two investors and a full insurance allocation, Kajii and Ui
(2006) show that there exists an agreeable bet on event E if and only if the maximum
of the probability of E for one investor is smaller than the minimum of that for the
other investor. In the case where each investor’s prior is the core of a convex capacity,
they show that an agreeable bet on some event exists if and only if there is no common
prior, hence it is equivalent to the existence of an agreeable trade. Dominiak et al.
(2012) extend this result for the CEU model with not necessarily convex capacities.
An agreeable bet on E is replicated in our model by an incomplete markets setting
with one security that pays 1 if E occurs and 0 otherwise. As we discuss in Section 4,
we can generalize our approach to an incomplete markets setting, by having a partition
of the state space and each available security paying 1 if an event E of the partition
occurs and 0 otherwise. Theorem 2 improves on the results of Kajii and Ui (2006)
and Dominiak et al. (2012) by providing a characterization of no-trade for any finite
number of investors with general convex preferences and any initial allocation, many
available securities but maximum perceived complexity of the asset structure. More
importantly, our characterization applies irrespective of whether an agreeable trade
(absence of perceived complexity) is equivalent to an agreeable bet (maximum perceived
complexity), which is crucial in separating between models with smooth and non-
smooth preferences. However, we impose a no-arbitrage condition, whereas Kajii and
Ui (2006) and Dominiak et al. (2012) do not.
Our definition of complexity relates to how investors perceive the asset structure.
Alternatively, Caballero and Simsek (2013) use ambiguity and the notion of complexity
about the structure of cross exposures of banks to explain market freezes.
Rigotti and Shannon (2005) characterize Pareto optima and equilibria in the incom-
plete preferences model of Knightian uncertainty of Bewley (1986). This model is used
also by Easley and O’Hara (2010) to explain no-trade. Rigotti and Shannon (2012)
show that generic determinacy is a robust feature of general equilibrium models with
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ambiguity averse preferences, because kinks are relatively rare, whereas robust inde-
terminacies arise naturally in the model of Bewley (1986), where kinks are ubiquitous.
Although we prove our results only for complete convex preferences, it is straightfor-
ward to extend them in the incomplete preferences model of Bewley (1986).3 In this
model, the indifference curve at any endowment has a kink, hence maximum com-
plexity would generically shut down trade, as opposed to some models with ambiguity
aversion, where indifference curves are smooth at non full insurance endowments.
Our main difference from these papers is that we use complexity in order to explain
no-trade in an environment where there are actually gains from trade. This difference
is important, because we suggest that if complexity was lifted then there would be gains
from trade, whereas the aforementioned papers suggest that (in the case of no-trade)
uncertainty has destroyed all gains from trade. Moreover, our mechanism can help
explain the BNP Paribas incident, by suggesting that the market froze not because
of the initial event that created uncertainty (and hence ambiguity or incompleteness)
about house prices, but due to the investors’ realization that the payoff structure was
too difficult to understand.
Rigotti and Shannon (2005) provide conditions under which endogenous incomplete
markets can arise. Roughly, if investors have different but precise probabilities about
some states but similar but imprecise probabilities about the remaining states, then
they trade only A-D securities contingent on the former set, so it is as if the latter
securities are missing. Our focus is different, because we ask whether trade would
still occur in the case of maximum perceived complexity, which is not the same as an
incomplete markets structure with one available security. Since investors have different
and precise probabilities about at least one state, maximum perceived complexity does
not shut down trade in any such setting with endogenous incomplete markets.
Lang (2017) defines first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion and character-
izes them in term of whether the indifference curve at the endowment point has a kink
or it is smooth. He also provides several economic examples where this dichotomy
matters. Using his terminology, the present paper shows that second-order ambiguity
aversion implies that maximum perceived complexity does not shut down trade. Mihm
(2016) proposes a model of reference-dependent MEU preferences where the indiffer-
ence curve has a kink at the endowment, so that using our results maximum perceived
complexity can shut down trade.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on complex securities (Amromin et al.
(2011), Henderson and Pearson (2011), Ghent et al. (2017), Griffin et al. (2014), Hens
3See Section 4 for details.
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and Rieger (2014), Sato (2014)). Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2017) study more than 50,000
securities and show that complexity has increased over time. Simsek (2013) shows
that complexity increases opportunities for speculation in a model with heterogeneous
beliefs. He uses smooth (mean-variance) preferences for which, according to the present
paper, complexity does not shut down trade.
Our notion of complexity specifies that the investor has a coarse understanding of
his available trading strategies. Alternatively, several strands of the literature study
the coarse understanding of the state space, such as in decision theory (Dekel et al.
(2001), Epstein et al. (2007), Ahn and Ergin (2010)), unawareness (Fagin and Halpern
(1988), Heifetz et al. (2006), Galanis (2013)) and inattention (Sims (2003), Woodford
(2012), Gabaix (2014)).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an example
which illustrates our approach. Section 3 introduces the model and characterizes the
occurrence of trade in the case where all investors have maximum perceived complexity
of the asset structure. Section 4 concludes.
2 Illustration
We illustrate our approach using an example. Let S = {s1, s2, s3} be the state space,
describing the uncertainty about tomorrow. Consider a standard complete markets
setting with three A-D securities, each paying 1 if a particular state s ∈ S occurs
and 0 otherwise. The economy consists of two investors, i and j, who have the same
endowment e = (5, 5, 5), paying 5 at every state. We call this a full insurance allocation.
Their preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility (MEU) with ui(x) = x,
x ∈ R+. In particular, i’s utility from trade f i ∈ R3, where e+ f i ≥ 0, is
V i(e+ f i) = min
q∈Ci
∑
s∈S
ui(e(s) + f i(s))q(s),
where Ci ⊆ ∆S is a compact and convex set of beliefs.
Suppose that Ci is the convex hull of probabilities p1 = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2), p2 = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4)
and p3 = (0.3, 0.5, 0.2), whereas C
j is the convex hull of probabilities q1 = (0.4, 0.4, 0.2)
and q2 = (0.3, 0.4, 0.3).
These sets are shown in Figure 1. The triangle represents the probability simplex,
so that each point represents a probability on {s1, s2, s3}. A dashed line, which is
parallel to a side of the triangle, contains all probabilities that assign the same weight
on the state depicted opposite to that side. Set Ci is the triangle formed by p1, p2 and
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s1
s2 s3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.2
q1
q2p3
0.4
p2p1
0.6
Figure 1: Trade occurs only in the absence of complexity
p3, whereas C
j is the line formed by q1 and q2.
Because Ci and Cj are disjoint, there are trades that will make both strictly better
off than consuming their endowment, which gives utility 5. For example, consider
f i = (−3.2, 2.5,−0.5) and f j = (3.2,−2.5, 0.5), which is a trade because f i + f j = 0.
It is an agreeable trade because both investors strictly prefer it to their endowment,
as V i(e+ f i) = 5.16 and V j(e+ f j) = 5.11. Billot et al. (2000) show that in the MEU
model with a full insurance allocation, there is a trade (i.e. the initial allocation is not
Pareto optimal) if and only if the sets of beliefs are disjoint.
According to our terminology, {f i, f j} is a complex trade, because it provides a
different payoff at every state, hence its construction requires a combination of all
three A-D securities.
Suppose now that each investor is cognitively constrained, so that he can buy or
sell at most one A-D security and cannot combine two or more to construct a complex
trade. In other words, he can only formulate a coarse trade, which is measurable to
a two-element partition of S, consisting of a state and its complement. Then, trade
between the two investors translates to i betting on state s occurring, hence buying
the A-D security, and j betting on s not occurring, hence selling the same security.
Consider an A-D security on state s1, with price c < 1. If investor i sells it, he bets
that s1 will not occur and the trade he gets is f
i = (c− 1, c, c), whereas if j buys it he
gets f j = (1− c,−c,−c).
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Let pi(s) = max
p∈Ci
p(s) and pi(s) = min
p∈Ci
p(s) be i’s maximum and minimum belief on
state s. If both investors agree on this simple trade {f i, f j}, then investor imust strictly
prefer e+ f i over e, and similarly for j. In particular, V i(e+ f i) = 5 + pi(s1)(c− 1) +
(1−pi(s1))c > V i(e) = 5 and V j(e+f j) = 5+pj(s1)(1−c)−(1−pj(s1))c > V j(e) = 5.
These inequalities imply pj(s1) > c > p
i(s1). In other words, i agrees to sell if all of
his beliefs place a small weight on s1 happening, relative to j’s beliefs. Similarly, i
buys the A-D security on s1 that j sells if p
j(s1) < c < p
i(s1). Put more compactly, if
the two investors agree to bet on s1 then [p
i(s1), p
i(s1)] ∩ [pj(s1), pj(s1)] = ∅ and the
converse is also true.
In this example the two investors do not agree to bet on s1 because [p
i(s1), p
i(s1)]∩
[pj(s1), p
j(s1)] 6= ∅, and the same is true for s2 and s3. Can we generalize this result,
so that we find sets of beliefs, C
i
and C
j
, such that they are disjoint if and only if the
two investors agree to bet on some state or, equivalently, to trade a particular A-D
security?
Let C
i
be the set of probability measures p such that pi(s) ≤ p(s) ≤ pi(s) for all
states s, and similarly for C
j
. In Figure 1, C
j
= Cj is still the convex hull of q1 and
q2. However, C
i
is bigger than Ci, as it is the convex hull of p1, p2, p3 and q2. It is
constructed by including all probabilities that are within the respective dashed lines.
It is straightforward that if [pi(s), pi(s)]∩ [pj(s), pj(s)] = ∅ for some s (so that there
is betting on that state), then C
i
and C
j
are disjoint. But the converse is not true. A
counterexample in Section 3.5 shows that even if [pi(s), pi(s)]∩ [pj(s), pj(s)] 6= ∅ for all
states, so that there is never any betting, C
i
and C
j
may still be disjoint. However, it
turns out that these cases violate the following no-arbitrage condition: it is not possible
for any investor to successfully offer to others a series of bets that others will accept
and it will give him a positive payoff at all states. Sets C
i
and C
j
have q2 as a common
element, which is consistent with no betting on any state.
We have shown that starting from an allocation where there are gains from trade and
as the investors’ perceived complexity of the asset structure increases, it is as if their sets
of beliefs expand and they are no longer disjoint, leading to a result of no-trade. The
example might seem restrictive because, with only three states, there is either maximum
perceived complexity (K = 2) or no perceived complexity (K = |S|). The following
modification shows that it is easy to construct an example where there is no-trade
with maximum perceived complexity, however there are trading opportunities with
intermediate perceived complexity (2 < K < |S|). Suppose there are four states and
preferences are as before, whereas each investor’s endowment is (5, 5, 5, 5). Let Ci be
the convex hull of probabilities p1 = (0.2, 0.6, 0.1, 0.1), p2 = (0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.2) and p3 =
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(0.3, 0.5, 0.1, 0.1), whereas Cj is the convex hull of probabilities q1 = (0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1)
and q2 = (0.3, 0.4, 0.15, 0.15). Compared to the initial example, the probability of
s3 is now equally divided between s3 and s4. Similar arguments show that there is
no-trade under maximum perceived complexity, because i is not willing to bet with
j at any state. However, there are trading opportunities with K = 3. For example,
trade f i = (−3.2, 2.5,−0.5,−0.5), f j = (3.2,−2.5, 0.5, 0.5) is strictly preferable because
V i(e+ f i) = 5.16 and V j(e+ f j) = 5.11.
We also assume MEU with linear u, two investors and a full insurance allocation.
Our main result, Theorem 2, shows that the arguments can be substantially generalized
to accommodate any allocation and any finite number of investors with preferences that
are complete, transitive, strongly monotonic and convex.
Instead of starting from a set Ci of beliefs which are specific to the MEU model,
we follow Rigotti et al. (2008) and consider the set of subjective beliefs pii(ei), which
are the prices of A-D securities, normalized to sum to 1, such that i would prefer not
trading his endowment ei.4 Mathematically, subjective beliefs are the normals of the
supporting hyperplanes of the indifference curve at the endowment point. If preferences
are smooth at the endowment then pii(ei) is a singleton, but if there is a kink then it
is a general convex and compact set. In the standard case of no perceived financial
complexity, Rigotti et al. (2008) show that an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only
if there is a common subjective belief.
In the case where investors have maximum perceived complexity of the asset struc-
ture, we establish that they agree to bet on a state if and only if the intervals defined
by their maximum and minimum subjective beliefs on that state are disjoint. For
this result, convexity of preferences is crucial. We then define pii(ei) in the same way
as C
i
and say that there is an S-common belief if the intersection for all investors
is nonempty. Our main result, Theorem 2, specifies that there there is trade in an
environment with maximum perceived complexity if and only if there is no S-common
belief. To achieve this characterization, we assume a no-arbitrage condition, only con-
sidering initial allocations where it is not possible for some investors to obtain a sure
profit by successfully offering a bet to all other investors. Proposition 1 characterizes
this no-arbitrage condition in terms of the investors’ subjective beliefs.
It is straightforward that trading between investors with maximum perceived com-
plexity of the asset structure implies trading in the absence of perceived complexity.
However, the converse is not true, as shown in Figure 1, which means that as com-
plexity increases (or investors become less sophisticated), trade may eventually stop
4In the MEU model with a full insurance allocation, Ci = pii(ei).
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completely. Nevertheless, trade in one environment is equivalent to trade in the other
environment if each investor’s set of subjective beliefs consists of a single probability
measure, which is the case of smooth (differentiable) indifference curves at the endow-
ment point. This observation allows us to obtain a dichotomy of models with convex
preferences (including most models with ambiguity aversion), in terms of whether the
investors’ perceived complexity of the asset structure impedes trade.
3 Model
3.1 Set up
Consider a set I of investors with typical element i and a single consumption good.
Uncertainty is represented by a finite set of payoff relevant states S, with typical
element s. The set of consequences is R+, interpreted as monetary payoffs. Investor
i has binary preference relation %i on the set of acts F = RS+, which satisfies the
following standard axioms.
Axiom 1. (Preference). %i is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2. (Continuity). For all f ∈ F , the sets {g ∈ F : g %i f} and {g ∈ F : f %i g}
are closed.
Axiom 3. (Convexity). For all f ∈ F , the set {g ∈ F|g %i f} is convex.
Axiom 4. (Strong Monotonicity). For all f 6= g, if f ≥ g, then f i g.
An economy is a tuple {%i, ei}i∈I , where |I| ≥ |S| + 1 and {ei}i∈I ∈ RSI++ is the
interior initial allocation. An economy is large if each investor i has at least |S| copies.
We assume a complete market with a collection {ds}s∈S of A-D securities, where
ds has price ps and pays 1 if state s occurs and 0 otherwise. A portfolio {as}s∈S at
prices {ps}s∈S generates net trade f ∈ RS such that f =
∑
s∈S
asds − 1
∑
s∈S
asps, where
as denotes the units of security ds which are bought if as > 0 or sold if as < 0 and 1
pays 1 at every state. Investor i weakly prefers this portfolio to his initial endowment
if ei + f %i ei.
3.2 Subjective beliefs
Based on Yaari (1969), Rigotti et al. (2008) define investor i’s subjective beliefs at an
act f to be the normals (normalized to be probabilities) of all supporting hyperplanes
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at f ,
pii(f) = {p ∈ ∆S : Epg ≥ Epf for all g %i f},
where Epf =
∑
s∈S
p(s)f(s) is the expectation of f given probability measure p. For
convex preferences, pii(f) is nonempty, convex and compact.
Rigotti et al. (2008) establish the following two properties for strictly positive acts f
and convex preferences.5 First, Epf ≥ Epg for some p ∈ pii(f) implies f %i g. Second,
Epg > Epf for all p ∈ pii(f) implies g + (1− )f i f for sufficiently small  > 0.
3.3 Common beliefs
We say that there is a common belief at initial allocation {ei}i∈I if
⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) 6= ∅.
For each s ∈ S, let pi(s) = min
p∈pii(ei)
p(s) and pi(s) = max
p∈pii(ei)
p(s) be i’s minimum and
maximum subjective belief about s, respectively. Let
pii(ei) = {q ∈ ∆S : pi(s) ≤ q(s) ≤ pi(s) for all s ∈ S}
be the set of probability measures that are within i’s minimum and maximum subjective
beliefs at ei, for each s ∈ S.6 We next define a weaker notion of common beliefs.
Definition 1. There is an S-common belief at {ei}i∈I if
⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) 6= ∅.
Because pii(ei) ⊆ pii(ei), if there is a common belief then there is a S-common belief
but the converse is not true, as shown in Figure 1. However, if pii(ei) is a singleton for
each i, then the two notions are equivalent.7 In Section 3.7, we show that there is trade
in the presence of maximum perceived complexity if and only if there is no S-common
belief.
3.4 Trades and bets
We say that f ∈ RS is a bet on state s ∈ S if there exist a, b ∈ R, ab < 0, such that
f(s′) = a if s′ = s and f(s′) = b otherwise. A bet on s can be constructed by buying or
short selling some units of an A-D security ds that pays 1 if s occurs and 0 otherwise.
A bet on s where a > 0 > b can be generated by buying, at price − ba−b , a− b units of
5An act f is strictly positive if f(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S.
6Note that pii(ei) is a closed and convex polytope, as it is bounded and the intersection of half spaces.
7The converse is not true, so that if the set of common beliefs is equal to the set of S-common beliefs, it
is not the case that each pii(ei) is a singleton.
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ds. If state s does not occur, then the payoff is (a − b) ba−b = b < 0. If s occurs, the
payoff is (a− b) ba−b + a− b = a > 0.
Similarly, a bet on s where b > 0 > a can be generated by selling, at price bb−a ,
b− a units of ds. If state s does not occur, then the payoff is (b− a) bb−a = b > 0. If s
occurs, the payoff is (b− a) bb−a − (b− a) = a < 0.
Tuple {f i}i∈I ∈ RSI is a trade if
∑
i∈I
f i = 0 and ei + f i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I. It is a bet
if, additionally, each f i is a bet on some s. Trade {f i}i∈I is agreeable if ei + f i i ei
for all i ∈ I. A trade is an agreeable bet if it is an agreeable trade and a bet.
3.5 No-arbitrage
Gains from trade exist at an allocation if it is not Pareto optimal. However, in an en-
vironment with uncertainty and no common prior, the notion of Pareto improvement
is not as compelling as in an environment with certainty.8 In what follows, we only
consider Pareto improvements from initial allocations that satisfy a no-arbitrage con-
dition, so that it is not possible for some investors to make a sure profit by offering a
trade or a bet that others are willing to take. We then show in Proposition 1 that this
condition imposes a restriction on the investors’ subjective beliefs at this allocation.
Definition 2. Tuple {f i}i∈I ∈ RSI is an arbitrage trade at endowment e if it is an
agreeable trade and there exist partitions {A,B} of I and {Si}i∈B of S such that:
• for all i ∈ A, f i(s) = ki > 0 for all s ∈ S,
• for all i ∈ B, f i = ∑
s∈Si
hs, where hs is a bet on s,
• for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S, ei %i ei − hs.
It is an arbitrage bet at e if, additionally, each Si is a singleton.
In an arbitrage trade there are two types of investors. Each i ∈ A is an arbitrageur,
receiving a positive and fixed payoff ki at each state, thus making a sure profit. Each
i ∈ B is a bettor, willing to bet on all states s ∈ Si. That is, he prefers ei +
∑
s∈Si
hs over
ei. If Si is a singleton, then he only bets on one state s and receives e
i +hs. Note that
two bettors never bet on the same state, but collectively they all bet on the whole state
space. Because the securities are in zero net supply, the sure profit of the arbitrageurs
(the sum of all ki’s) is equal to −
∑
s∈S
hs, the opposite side of all the bets made by the
8See Gilboa et al. (2014) and Brunnermeier et al. (2014) for a discussion of this issue in the subjective
expected utility environment.
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bettors. The third condition specifies that no investor is willing to take the opposite
side of an individual bet hs. That is, he prefers his endowment ei over e
i − hs.9
An arbitrageur i ∈ A who receives ki may still have maximum perceived complexity
of the asset structure, because his trade is constant across all states. However, if all
investors have maximum perceived complexity, then they may not be able to formulate
arbitrage trades, because these may require that a bettor trades more than one A-D
security. In that case, they will still be able to formulate arbitrage bets, where each
bettor i ∈ B bets only on one state and Si is a singleton.
Definition 3. There is no arbitrage at e if there are no arbitrage trades at e, or there
are no arbitrage bets at e and the economy is large.
It is important to emphasise that no-arbitrage is a joint restriction on preferences
and endowments, not on prices of assets. We require this condition in Theorem 2,
which characterizes trading in the case where all investors have maximum perceived
complexity of the asset structure. When the economy is large, so there are |S| copies of
each investor i, we only need to assume that there are no arbitrage bets at e. As we show
below, no-arbitrage is characterized in terms of subjective beliefs. More importantly,
it excludes cases where there is no bet on any state, yet there is no S-common belief.
Fix preferences and the initial endowment e. As we argued in the example of Section
2 and Theorem 2 below generalizes, there is an agreeable bet on state s between i and
j if and only if [pi(s), pi(s)]
⋂
[pj(s), pj(s)] = ∅, implying that either pi(s) > pj(s) or
pj(s) > pi(s). In other words, the A-D prices about s that would sustain zero net
demand are very different for i and j. More generally, define
[q(s), q(s)] ≡
⋂
i∈I
[pi(s), pi(s)]
to be the conjunction of all the constraints about state s that an S-common belief must
satisfy. Then, [q(s), q(s)] = ∅ is equivalent to the existence of a bet on s between two
investors.
If [q(s), q(s)] = ∅ for some state s, then it is straightforward that there is no S-
common belief. However, the converse is not true. It is possible that [q(s), q(s)] 6= ∅
for all s ∈ S, so that there is no agreeable bet on any state, yet there is no S-common
belief. However, in that case there are arbitrage opportunities.
To show this, consider the following example with four states and five investors.
Investors i = 1, 2 have identical preferences and endowments. Their set of subjective
beliefs pii(ei) is the convex hull of the following three probabilities,
9If he were, he might be tempted to enter into a bidding war and offer a bet with better odds.
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(0.2315, 0.0385, 0.2773, 0.4527),
(0.2306, 0.1668, 0.3948, 0.2078),
(0.1549, 0.0163, 0.4365, 0.3923).
Investors i = 3, 4, 5 have identical preferences and endowments. Their set of sub-
jective beliefs pii(ei) is the convex hull of probabilities
(0.0303, 0.5476, 0.3179, 0.1042),
(0.4765, 0.1215, 0.1492, 0.2528),
(0.3107, 0.2340, 0.3140, 0.1413).
We then have that [q(s1), q(s1)] = [0.1549, 0.2315], [q(s2), q(s2)] = [0.1215, 0.1668],
[q(s3), q(s3)] = [0.2773, 0.3179] and [q(s4), q(s4)] = [0.2078, 0.2528]. There is no S-
common belief because any p that satisfies the previous four constraints has at most∑
s∈S
p(s) ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s) = 0.969 < 1.
However, this example is problematic because it allows for arbitrage. Fix
∑
s∈S
q(s) <
1 and consider, for each state s, a bet fas for investor i with endowment e
i and q(s) =
pi(s), that pays as − 1 if s occurs and as otherwise, where as is bigger but arbitrarily
close to pi(s), so that
∑
s∈S
as < 1. This bet can be generated by short selling an A-D
security ds at price as.
Because the expectation Ep(fas + ei) = as − p(s) + Epei > Epei for all p ∈ pii(ei),
convexity of preferences implies that for small enough k > 0, investor i strictly prefers
the convex combination k(fas + e
i) + (1− k)ei = kfas + ei to ei.
Investor 5 (the arbitrageur) can offer bet kfas1 to investor 1, kfas2 to investor 2,
kfas3 to investor 3 and kfas4 to investor 4, such that
∑
s∈S
as < 1. Essentially, investor
5 is offering to buy k units of A-D security ds at price as, for each state s. These
bets are going to be accepted, because they make each i = 1, 2, 3, 4 strictly better off.
Moreover, no other investor is willing to take the opposite side of each bet, −kfas .
However, investor 5’s payoff at any state s is −k∑
s′ 6=s
as′ − k(as − 1) = −k(
∑
s∈S
as − 1) =
k(1− ∑
s∈S
as) > 0. Hence, all conditions of Definition 2 are satisfied.
The following Proposition generalizes this result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that for each s ∈ S, [q(s), q(s)] ≡ ⋂
i∈I
[pi(s), pi(s)] 6= ∅. Then,
no-arbitrage at e implies
∑
s∈S
q(s) ≤ 1 ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s). Conversely,
∑
s∈S
q(s) ≤ 1 ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s)
implies that there are no arbitrage bets at e.
Proof. Suppose that for each s ∈ S, [q(s), q(s)] = ⋂
i∈I
[pi(s), pi(s)] 6= ∅ and ∑
s∈S
q(s) < 1.
Choose as > q(s) such that
∑
s∈S
as < 1. We will construct an arbitrage trade {f i}i∈I ,
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or an arbitrage bet in the case that the economy is large. Note that for each s ∈ S,
q(s) = pi(s) for some i ∈ I and q(s) ≤ pj(s) for all j ∈ I.
Consider bet fs,a that pays a − 1 at s and a otherwise. For all a such that a >
pi(s) = q(s), we have that Ep(fs,a + ei) = a − p(s) + Epei > Epei for all p ∈ pii(ei).
From the second property of pii, there exists small enough k ∈ (0, 1) such that k(fs,a +
ei) + (1 − k)ei = kfs,a + ei i ei. Therefore, investor i would strictly prefer to get
bet kfs,a which pays ka− k at s and ka otherwise. Moreover, this is also true for any
0 < k0 < k. Note that investor i is a bettor and belongs to set B of Definition 2.
The third condition of an arbitrage trade is also satisfied because [q(s), q(s)] 6= ∅
and a > pi(s) = q(s) imply a > pi(s) for all i ∈ I. This means that Ep(−fs,a + ei) =
−a+ pi(s) +Epei < Epei for some p ∈ pii(ei), hence the first property of the subjective
beliefs implies that ei %i ei − fs,a. From convexity, we also have ei %i ei − kfs,a.
By repeating the same argument for each s ∈ S, we can create a tuple {ksfs,as}s∈S
of bets. If the economy is not large, there is the possibility that for the same investor
i ∈ B we have pi(s) = q(s), pi(s′) = q(s′) and this can be true for more than two
states. Then, the same arguments show that investor i would strictly prefer to get
ksfs,as + ks′fs′,as′ . However, in this case i receives an f
i that provides different payoffs
in s, s′ and S \ {s, s′}, hence it is an arbitrage trade and not an arbitrage bet. If the
economy is large, then there are |S| investors with the same preferences as i, hence we
can assign to each copy a bet on a different state.
By setting k = min
s∈S
ks, the new tuple is {kfas}s∈S , where for each i with q(s) = pi(s)
we have f i = kfas and kfas + e
i i ei. Because there are at least |S|+ 1 investors, we
can assign one investor i∗ to take the opposite side of {kfas}s∈S , which yields
∑
s∈S
−kfas
and pays −k∑
s′ 6=s
as′ − k(as− 1) = k(1−
∑
s∈S
as) > 0 at all states. In other words, i
∗ ∈ A
is an arbitrageur. For any j who has not been offered kfas for some s ∈ S, we let
f j(s) = kj > 0 for all s ∈ S, where kj is arbitrarily small. From Axiom 4, each j would
strictly prefer to accept f j and this is affordable because
∑
s∈S
− kfas is strictly positive
at all states, so i∗ would get a slightly lower payoff at each state and each such j ∈ A
is an arbitrageur as well. Hence, we have created an arbitrage trade, or an arbitrage
bet in the case of a large economy. We can create a similar arbitrage opportunity if∑
i∈I
q(s) > 1, with bets that pay k − kas at s and −kas otherwise, where q(s) > as, for
small enough k > 0.
Conversely, suppose
∑
s∈S
q(s) ≤ 1 ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s) but there is an arbitrage bet {f i}i∈I .
By definition we have
∑
i∈B
f i < 0 and f i + ei i ei for all i ∈ B, where f i is of the form
f i(si) = ai and f i(s) = bi for s 6= si, ai 6= bi. From the first property of pii(ei) and
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Axiom 4, we have that Ep(ei + f i) > Epei for all p ∈ pii(ei), all i ∈ I.
We next show that Epf i > 0 for all p ∈ pii(ei) and all i ∈ I. For all i ∈ A this
is obvious, as they receive a fixed positive payoff at all states. Fix i ∈ B and let
si = s. Note that pi(s)ai + pi(S \ s)bi > 0 and pi(s)ai + pi(S \ s)bi > 0, because
1− pi(s) = pi(S \ s) and 1− pi(s) = pi(S \ s), where pi(E) = min
p∈pii(ei)
p(E) and pi(E) =
max
p∈pii(ei)
p(E), for any event E ⊆ S. Take p ∈ pii(ei). If p(s) = p(s) or p(s) = p(s) then
we are done. Suppose p(s) < p(s) < p(s) and let q1(s) = p(s), q2(s) = p(s), where
q1, q2 ∈ pii(ei). Let λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λq1(s) + (1−λ)q2(s) = p(s), which implies that
λq1(S \ s) + (1−λ)q2(S \ s) = p(S \ s). We also have that q1(s)ai + q1(S \ s)bi > 0 and
q2(s)a
i + q2(S \ s)bi > 0. Multiplying with λ, 1−λ, and adding the two inequalities we
have that Epf i = p(s)ai + p(S \ s)bi > 0.
Because
∑
s∈S
q(s) ≤ 1 ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s), there exists a ∈ [0, 1] such that a∑
s∈S
q(s) + (1 −
a)
∑
s∈S
q(s) = 1. For each s ∈ S, let p(s) = aq(s)+(1−a)q(s). We then have ∑
s∈S
p(s) = 1,
so that p is a probability measure such that p(s) ∈ [q(s), q(s)] for all s ∈ S, hence
p ∈ ⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) 6= ∅. Using this p and by adding Epf i > 0 over all i ∈ B we have∑
i∈B
Epf i = Ep
∑
i∈B
f i < 0, a contradiction.
3.6 Absence of complexity
Consider first the standard environment of no perceived complexity, where each investor
can understand and trade any combination of the A-D securities. In other words, his
trade can be measurable with respect to any partition of S, even the finest one. We
say that there is trade in the absence of perceived complexity if there is an agreeable
trade {f i}i∈I ∈ RSI , so that {ei}i∈I is not Pareto optimal. Recall that an agreeable
trade is such that
∑
i∈I
f i = 0 and ei + f i i ei for all i ∈ I.10 Proposition 7 in Rigotti
et al. (2008) shows that interior allocation {ei}i∈I is not Pareto optimal if and only
there is no common subjective belief, so that
⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) = ∅.11
Theorem 1. There is trade in the absence of complexity if and only if there is no
common subjective belief.
10Note that because of Axiom 4, {ei}i∈I is not Pareto optimal (
∑
i∈I
f i = 0, f i + ei %i ei for all i ∈ I and
f j + ej j ej for some j ∈ I) if and only if ∑
i∈I
f i = 0 and ei + f i i ei for all i ∈ I.
11Theorem 3 in Rigotti and Shannon (2005) proves the same result in the incomplete preferences model
of Bewley (1986).
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3.7 Maximum perceived complexity
Consider now a setting where preferences and the allocation {ei}i∈I are still the same,
however each investor is so unsophisticated or cognitively constraint that he can buy
or sell at most one A-D security, instead of any linear combination, as in the previous
section. This means that his available trades are coarse, as they need to be measurable
with respect to a two-element partition {s, S \ s} of the state space.
The main result of the paper characterizes the existence of trading opportunities in
the case where investors have maximum perceived complexity of the asset structure,
under a no-arbitrage condition. We say that there is trade in the presence of maximum
perceived complexity if there is an agreeable bet.
Theorem 2. Under no-arbitrage at e, there is trade in the presence of maximum
perceived complexity if and only if there is no S-common belief.
Proof. Suppose that
⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) = ∅. We first show that ⋂
i∈I
[pi(s), pi(s)] = ∅ for some
s ∈ S. Suppose not, so that for each s ∈ S, [q(s), q(s)] ≡ ⋂
i∈I
[pi(s), pi(s)] 6= ∅. No-
arbitrage and Proposition 1 imply that
∑
s∈S
q(s) ≤ 1 ≤ ∑
s∈S
q(s). Let a ∈ [0, 1] such that
a
∑
s∈S
q(s) + (1− a)∑
s∈S
q(s) = 1. For each s ∈ S, let p(s) = aq(s) + (1− a)q(s). We then
have
∑
s∈S
p(s) = 1, so that p is a probability measure such that p(s) ∈ [q(s), q(s)] for all
s ∈ S, contradicting that ⋂
i∈I
pii(ei) = ∅.
We therefore have that, for some i, j ∈ I and s∗ ∈ S, [pi(s∗), pi(s∗)]⋂[pj(s∗), pj(s∗)] =
∅. Suppose without loss of generality that pi(s∗) > pj(s∗). Let c be such that
pi(s∗) > c > pj(s∗). Define bet f on s∗ such that f(s∗) = 1 − c and f(s) = −c
for s 6= s∗. We then have that Epf = p(s∗)(1− c)− (1− p(s∗))c > 0 for all p ∈ pii(ei)
and Ep(−f) = p(s∗)(−1 + c) + (1− p(s∗))c > 0 for all p ∈ pij(ej).
Define bet {fk}k∈I such that f i(s∗) = f(s∗) −  and f i(s) = f(s) for s 6= s∗, for
sufficiently small  > 0 such that the above inequality still holds. For each k 6= i, j, let
fk(s∗) = |I\{i,j}| and f
k(s) = 0 for s 6= s∗. Let f j = −f .
By Axiom 4, for all k ∈ I, each p ∈ pik(ek) has full support on S. Hence, for small
enough  > 0 we have, for all k ∈ I, Epfk > 0 for all p ∈ pik(ek) and Ep(fk + ek) >
Epek. From the second property of pik(ek), there exists small enough λk > 0 such that
λk(ek + fk) + (1 − λk)ek = λkfk + ek k ek. By taking λ = min
k∈I
λk, we have that
ek + λfk k ek for all k ∈ I. Because ∑
k∈I
λfk = 0, {λfk}k∈I is an agreeable bet.
Conversely, suppose there is an agreeable bet {f i}i∈I . This means that
∑
i∈I
f i = 0
and each f i is of the form f i(si) = ai and f i(s) = bi for s 6= si, where ai 6= bi.
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Moreover, f i + ei i ei for all i ∈ I. From the first property of pii(ei) and Axiom 4, we
have that Ep(ei + f i) > Epei for all p ∈ pii(ei), all i ∈ I. In the proof of Proposition 1,
we show that the same inequality Epf i > 0 holds for all p ∈ pii(ei), all i ∈ I. Suppose
there is an S-common belief p. Then, by adding Epf i > 0 over all investors we have
0 <
∑
i∈I
Epf i = Ep
∑
i∈I
f i = 0, a contradiction.
4 Concluding remarks
We characterize the existence of trading opportunities in two environments which are
the extreme opposites in terms of the investors’ perceived complexity of the asset
structure. The first is the standard setting of no perceived complexity, where each
investor is sophisticated enough to be able to understand and trade any combination
of the available securities. In the second, each investor has cognitive limitations so that
even though he can understand each A-D security separately, he cannot combine two
or more and construct a complex trade. In other words, he can only formulate a coarse
trade which is measurable with respect to a two-element partition of the state space,
consisting of a state and its complement.
Our main question is, can this type of complexity explain market freezes? The
answer depends on the investors’ attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. We first show
that for smooth preferences, even if all investors have maximum perceived complexity
of the asset structure, not all trading opportunities are destroyed, meaning that if there
is an agreeable trade (no perceived complexity), there is an agreeable bet (maximum
perceived complexity). More importantly, trading opportunities are not destroyed even
if we were to provide a more detailed but (necessarily) weaker definition of complexity
(e.g. generating complexity endogenously through cognitive costs or computational
complexity), as long as each investor can trade at least one security. In other words, our
result for these preferences that complexity does not impede trade is robust, because it
is independent of the particular details of how a complex security is defined. Examples
of smooth preferences are subjective expected utility, the smooth variational preferences
of Maccheroni et al. (2006) (including, as special cases, the mean-variance preferences
of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) and the multiplier preferences of Hansen and
Sargent (2001)), the smooth ambiguity of Klibanoff et al. (2005) and the second-order
expected utility of Ergin and Gul (2009).
If preferences are non-smooth, we find that maximum perceived complexity can im-
pede trade. These are preferences for which there are multiple sets of A-D prices that
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support zero net demand at the initial allocation, because the indifference curve has a
kink at the endowment point. Examples are the CEU with convex capacity of Schmei-
dler (1989), the MEU of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the non-smooth variational
preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006), the confidence preferences of Chateauneuf and
Faro (2009) and the uncertainty averse preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011). For
instance, in the MEU model with a full insurance allocation, each investor’s subjective
beliefs coincide with his (non unique) priors and his indifference curve has a kink at
his endowment. As shown in Figure 1, in that case maximum perceived complexity of
the asset structure completely shuts down trade.
Our results make heavy use of the following property of convex preferences. If
the expectation of security gi = f i + ei, according to all of i’s subjective beliefs at
his endowment ei, is higher than the expectation of ei, then there exists a convex
combination of gi and ei that investor i strictly prefers to ei. This property is also true
in the incomplete preferences model of Bewley (1986), which means that our results
apply there as well. The distinctive property of this model is that indifference curves
have a kink at each endowment, whereas in some well known models with convex and
complete preferences, such as MEU, kinks appear only at a full insurance endowment.
Our results then predict that maximum perceived complexity would shut down trade
at all allocations in the Bewley (1986) model but only at full insurance allocations in
the MEU model.
Finally, our results can be generalized to an incomplete markets setting, by having
a partition P of S. Given event E ∈ P, there exists a security that pays 1 if E occurs
and 0 otherwise. A constrained Pareto optimal allocation (i.e. no-trade in the absence
of complexity) is then characterized by the existence of a P-common belief, meaning
that all investors agree on all events in P according to one of their subjective beliefs.
Similarly, no-trade in the presence of maximum perceived complexity is characterized
by a P-common belief, so that there exists a probability measure which is between the
maximum and minimum probability assigned to each event P, by all investors.
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